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Popular discontent over perceived widespread corruption was at the root of 
the Arab uprisings of 2011/2012 and of other upheavals worldwide since the 
turn of the millennium. However, the case of Jordan illustrates that con-
ventional approaches to tackling corruption are insufficient. In order to be 
adequately addressed, corruption must be understood as a problem of dis-
tributive rather than criminal justice.
 • Like all other Arab countries, popular discontent over perceived corruption 
runs high in Jordan. However, what people refer to normally are not the usual 
cases of bribery and extortion, which remain relatively low. Rather, they refer 
to local practices of political patronage and favouritism known as wasta.
 • Diagnosing wasta as a form of corruption and a problem of legal justice has led 
to generally ineffective approaches to curbing it. Because wasta usually does 
not involve legal infringements, but instead takes place within formal legal pro-
cedures, conventional approaches to fighting corruption that stress the rule of 
law and transparency fail to address it. 
 • Democratisation as such also does not solve wasta as a problem. In parlia-
mentary politics, wasta constitutes the bulk of the activities of any member 
of parliament. This contributes to the perception of members of parliament 
as providers of highly personal services to their constituencies rather than as 
le gislators. It also contributes to popular perceptions of the parliament as a 
deeply corrupt institution.
Policy Implications
Wasta constitutes a problem when it provides differential access to common re­
sources managed by the state. Therefore, instead of concentrating only on polit­
ical and administrative reforms, development efforts should focus on rebuilding 
welfare­state infrastructure that provides universal access to citizens.
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Perceptions of Corruption in the Middle East
Since the beginning of the 2000s, corruption has been a prominent cause of politi-
cal upheavals in various parts of the world, from Eastern Europe to Asia, Africa, and 
Latin America, and more recently in various EU countries and the United States. 
In this sense, the wave of Arab uprisings between 2011 and 2012 was no exception. 
While the grievances articulated by activists in the Middle East have varied from 
one country to another depending on local histories and circumstances, corrup-
tion was the common denominator across the various countries with their different 
economic and political systems. Hence, many Arab countries have recently intro-
duced political, legal, administrative, and economic reforms to tackle the perceived 
widespread corruption. While it might be too early to assess the full effects of these 
reforms, a closer look at the reforms introduced by Jordan – a country where polit-
ical protests focused almost exclusively on corruption – suggests that the conven-
tional understanding of corruption as a problem of criminal justice is insufficient. 
Conventional approaches to fighting corruption, such as legal and administrative 
reforms that promote democratisation, transparency, and the rule of law risk miss-
ing some key factors that contribute to popular perceptions of corruption (Wedel 
2012). At best, these methods of addressing corruption will be insufficient; at worst, 
they may lead to increased social and political distrust and become grounds for the 
spread and legitimation of corrupt practices. An understanding of corruption as a 
problem of distributive justice rather than criminal justice promises better ways 
to address political grievances in the Middle East and beyond. Most immediately, 
institutions of social welfare need to be supported and developed rather than dis-
mantled, their functions privatised.
Arab countries generally do not fare well in Transparency International’s (TI) 
Corruption Perception Index rankings. Somalia, Syria, Yemen, Sudan, Libya, and 
Iraq were amongst the lowest-ranking countries in the world in 2016 (Transpar-
ency International 2017). Jordan, by contrast, seems like a success story. It ranked 
57th in the world and 4th in the Middle East and North Africa (after the UAE, 
 Qatar, and Israel) and even improved by five points over the previous year. Popular 
perceptions, by contrast, diverge significantly. A recent study by TI’s local chapter 
indicates that 75 per cent of Jordanians believed that corruption had increased, 
rather than decreased, in 2016. But given how high the popular perception of cor-
ruption is, it might come as a surprise that the same study mentions that only 3 per 
cent of those surveyed paid bribes of one sort or another during that year. Equally 
surprising may be the fact that legal institutions like the judiciary and law enforce-
ment scored high in terms of public trust, while the parliament scored the lowest 
(Rasheed Coalition for Integrity 2017).
These discrepancies can be explained by the notion that when Jordanians com-
plain about entrenched corruption they usually refer not to bribery and extortion, 
but to a form of political patronage and intercessory mediation known as wasta. 
Wasta is a widespread practice in the Arab world that bears resemblance to prac-
tices in other places, such as blat in Russia (Ledeneva 1998), raccomandazione in 
Italy (Zinn 2001), pulling strings in the United States, protektzia in Israel (Danet 
1989), Beziehungen in Germany, and guanxi in China (Smart and Hsu 2007). While 
the scope and political significance of these practices may vary from one place to an-
other, they all function as economies of favours and have a vexed status in the pol-
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itical sphere as forms of both social solidarity and corruption. In the Middle East, 
wasta predominates in electoral politics. Understanding how wasta works in the 
political sphere and in what sense it is perceived as a form of corruption illustrates 
why democratisation, rule of law, and transparency are insufficient as remedies, 
and what alternative approaches need to be taken.
What is Wasta?
In the Arabic language, wasta can be defined as both “mediator” and “means.” 
Scholars of wasta often distinguish between two forms: The first is the practice 
of mediating between adversaries in a tribal conflict. The second is the practice of 
interceding on behalf of a supplicant to obtain some kind of advantage from a third 
party (Cunningham and Sarayrah 1993). In Jordan and the rest of the Middle East, 
both kinds of wasta continue to be practised, permeating all aspects of social life. 
Politically, they are a modality by which individuals can attain social and political 
ascendancy. Individuals who routinely and successfully act as wastas are highly 
regarded in their communities as notables or leaders. Both kinds of wasta practices 
have roots in tribal chieftainship that predates the modern nation-state and were 
subsequently appropriated and transformed by the nation-state throughout the 
twentieth century. While the mediatory variety of wasta continues to be practised 
today – especially in paralegal tribal reconciliation processes – it is the intercessory 
variety that matters most for ascendancy in contemporary politics, albeit with a 
changed scope and nature. Tribal leaders of old were morally obliged to help their 
kin and friends without the demand for this help to be reciprocated. By contrast, 
modern forms of intercessory wasta are less about the performance of tribal virtues 
and moral obligations and more about the instrumental giving of favours in expect-
ation of return. 
Organisational life in the Middle East relies heavily on personal relations, in 
both the private and the public sector. Employees, in their professional capacity, 
often cannot get their work done without the personal relationships within their 
own and other organisations. For this reason, having connections and the ability 
to function as a wasta for one’s job is a highly prized professional asset and repre-
sents valuable social capital. This is particularly the case in regard to those private 
corporations that inevitably have routine dealings with the state bureaucracy. For 
example, NGOs, industrial companies, and financial institutions such as banks and 
insurance companies often employ high-ranking retirees from the public sector in 
their administration and public relations departments to facilitate their dealings 
with the state bureaucracy and expedite the processing of their paperwork. Par-
ticularly in the public sector, individual employees rely on their wasta connections 
to advance professionally. The career of any individual public servant is likely to 
include one or several wastas. S/he may need one wasta to find a job as a day-wage 
or temporary employee, another to be switched to a permanent contract, another 
to be transferred to a different department or location within the bureaucracy, and 
perhaps a few others to receive promotions or allowances or be granted early or 
deferred retirement. Ordinary citizens are likely to seek the help of their kin and 
friends within the bureaucracy to facilitate or expedite various benefits such as per-
mits, waivers, subsidies, and even the processing of simple documents and appli-
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cations. As will be discussed below, these wasta intercessions do not necessarily 
entail violating any law or bypassing the required bureaucratic procedures; rather, 
they exploit uncertainties and indeterminacies that naturally exist within formal 
laws and procedures.
But while in this general sense wasta is a positively valued social practice, its 
status in the political sphere – that is to say, in relation to the state and its public 
resources – is inherently vexed. According to one survey conducted in 2000, 86 per 
cent of Jordanians considered it a form of corruption and 87 per cent thought it 
should be eliminated. At the same time, 90 per cent said they expected to use wasta 
sometime in the future and 42 per cent thought their need for it was likely to in-
crease (Kilani and Sakijha 2002). A more recent study (National Council for Fam-
ily Affairs 2015: 65–67) notes that 82.6 per cent of Jordanians consider wasta a 
form of corruption. At the same time, 64.9 per cent believe that wasta is necessary 
for finding a job, and 42.8 per cent believe it is necessary to get their bureaucratic 
paperwork done. These ambivalent attitudes towards wasta find their starkest ex-
pression in the domain of electoral politics, where wasta most clearly functions as 
an economy of favours. Especially for people without influential connections, an 
elected official, whether in the parliament or in local municipal councils, plays the 
role of the wasta mediator even if those people are outside their network of kinship 
and friendship. Elected officials are perceived by the electorate primarily as service 
providers whose job is to supply personal and highly local assistance in attaining 
various benefits provided and managed by the state. 
Why Democratisation Is Not a Solution:  
The Moral Economy of Wasta in Electoral Politics
Members of parliament and elected officials in general function more as interces-
sory wasta connections between their constituencies and the state apparatus than 
as legislators. For their election, candidates rely heavily on their reputation as indi-
viduals who are able and willing to play the role of wasta between the constituency 
and the state. According to one former member of parliament (MP), an independent 
MP might dedicate 90 per cent of his or her time to wasta; one who is committed 
to party politics will dedicate 60 per cent. [1] While the accuracy of such estimates 
is hard to verify, they are nonetheless indicative and may help explain why many 
political parties, including the powerful Islamic Action Front, have included inde-
pendent candidates on their lists in recent elections. Within this framework, elec-
toral candidates understand the political game primarily as a politics of patronage 
and an economy of favours (Blaydes 2008; Lust 2009). Preparing for elections re-
quires that the candidate develop for him- or herself a public profile of dutifulness 
and beneficence through strategic acts of charity. Someone with a long career in the 
state apparatus can develop such a profile by providing wasta services to people in 
his or her future constituency. However, candidates from outside the state appar-
atus have other avenues at their disposal to build such a profile for themselves. For 
example, medical doctors can present themselves as beneficent by providing free 
examinations and treatment to the poor and to those without medical insurance. 
Wealthy candidates can do the same through public acts of philanthropy such as 
1 Former Jordanian MP 
Jamil al-Nimri, personal 
communication, June 
2013.
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donations to local organisations or individuals and families in need. The candidates 
need not conduct acts of charity themselves; they can also help members of their 
constituencies by acting as conduits to networks of personal connections and ac-
quaintances within the state bureaucracy and private institutions. 
In this process, candidates gain a reputation for beneficence and are there-
fore expected and trusted to continue to help members of the constituency attain 
mater ial needs after they are elected. Equally significant is that in the process of 
developing this reputation, candidates can accrue a kind of credit for the favours 
they have provided, which the benefactors feel should be reciprocated through vot-
ing. This reciprocal process, however, must be distinguished from two seemingly 
similar practices: the simple vote-for-services transaction, and explicit vote buying. 
 Voters make a clear distinction between voting for money and voting for a candi-
date they really value as deserving a seat in the parliament. The practice of voting 
as a repayment for or reciprocation of services, while relatively common, does not 
represent the norm, and although it is recognised by both MPs and constituents as 
an instrumental practice, it is nonetheless justifiable as a fair and even necessary 
transaction. The case of vote buying and black money, by contrast, is seen as a clear 
pathological case of corruption in a way that voting in exchange for services is not. 
In vote-for-services cases, the voter feels morally obliged to return the favour, but 
need not do so, while in vote buying s/he is simply selling his vote and must receive 
money in return. The former are based on relations of trust, while the latter are 
not. Hence, the proliferation of vote buying in recent years, particularly by wealthy 
candidates, must be understood not as a continuation of wasta politics, but as its 
breakdown. It is a response to the failure to secure the bonds of trust and obliga-
tion upon which wasta is built. Here, the breakdown of wasta networks leads to 
outright corrupt practices.
Once a candidate is elected to parliament, the politics of patronage and the 
economy of favours that brought him into office take on a different guise. Election 
to office gives the MP access to the upper echelons of the state bureaucracy and rul-
ing elites. From the perspective of an MP, parliament sessions are prime opportuni-
ties to meet ministers in person and petition them to fulfil specific requests from 
their electoral base. When face-to-face meetings are not possible, written messages 
travel back and forth between the MPs and ministers while parliamentary discus-
sions are under way. But beyond the sessions themselves, MPs cultivate personal 
relationships with ministers and other officials in the bureaucracy. This furthers 
their ability to provide benefits to their constituencies, but just as often to them-
selves. Through connections to the bureaucracy, MPs facilitate their existing busi-
nesses, learn about new business opportunities, and may gain access to information 
that helps secure lucrative government contracts – particularly those that do not 
require calls for bids. A recent investigative report by the news website Amman 
Net showed that MPs in the previous parliament (2012–2016) owned businesses 
worth JOD 1.5 billion (EUR 1.84 billion), either personally or through their kin 
(Shawabkah and Ghabari 2016). While the legality of this wealth cannot be easily 
determined, the palpable enrichment that access to parliamentary office provides to 
MPs contributes to their public perception as corrupt people.
When politics is a potential business, running for parliamentary elections be-
comes an investment. Candidates spend excessive amounts of money on their cam-
paigns to build their public image of beneficence, and may go into serious debt in 
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the expectation that they will reap the rewards when they win. But the relations that 
the MPs cultivate with individuals in the bureaucracy are not always convivial –  in 
fact, they can be quite contentious. MPs use their right of oversight over the execu-
tive to probe officials about real or bogus cases of corruption and misconduct and to 
extract benefits from them in exchange for dropping such probes and not causing 
future trouble for those officials. Like vote buying, the proliferation of this kind of 
contentious politics is a sign that the moral economy of wasta relations can no longer 
be easily secured. This can be clearly seen in situations where MPs fail to cultivate 
long-term friendships with influential officials due to class differences. An MP from 
a lower-class background who is unable to cultivate such friendships may resort to 
threats of political dissent, even the threat of personal harm inflicted against individ-
ual officials, to extract benefits for himself and his constituency. Such MPs develop a 
paradoxical public profile, not unlike the paradoxical perception of wasta itself. Like 
mafia bosses, they are perceived by their supporters as deeply corrupt people and 
strongmen who oppose the state’s unjust policies. Contrary to the common view that 
the politics of patronage produces acquiescent and docile parliaments, it can in fact 
lead to quite contentious parliamentary politics that build on popular sentiments of 
discontent, albeit without generating alternative political paradigms. 
Why the Rule of Law Is Not a Solution:  
Wasta as a Problem of Distributive Justice
Surveys of popular perceptions of wasta (Kilani and Sakijha 2002; National Coun-
cil for Family Affairs 2015) indicate ambivalent attitudes towards the practice. On 
the one hand, it is widely condemned as a form of corruption and, on the other, it 
is praised as a modality of attaining justice. These ambivalent attitudes were re-
flected in parliamentary discussions of Jordan’s Anti-Corruption Commission Law 
in 2006, which resulted in an ambiguous criminalisation of the practice. Under this 
law and its subsequent amendments, wasta was criminalised if it “nullifies a right 
or validates what is void.” [2] Thus, while the law specifies certain kinds of wasta 
as a crime, it criminalises wasta only when it constitutes an infringement, without 
specifying what legal right it is an infringement of. Consequently, in the 11 years 
that have elapsed since the criminalisation of wasta, not a single case has resulted 
in a conviction, a record that mirrors that of other countries in the region that have 
also criminalised the practice, such as Palestine, Iraq, Egypt, and Saudi Arabia. Ac-
cording to the Jordanian Anti-Corruption Commission, wasta is a difficult crime to 
prove except when it intersects with other types of corruption already specified in 
the Jordanian Penal Code No. 16 of 1960 as “offences to public office duties,” such 
as bribery, graft, and embezzlement. In contrast to these other offences, wasta pro-
duces little by way of legal evidence. [3]
One main reason why wasta leaves little evidence that can lead to a criminal 
case is that the majority of wasta cases are not illegal. For example, the vast major-
ity of those who solicit wasta from MPs for employment seek jobs that require little 
to no skill – for instance, day labourers, drivers, foremen, guards, electric meter 
readers, and machine operators. When applying for these jobs, the supplicant has to 
satisfy the formal requirements of the position without which his application would 
2 Anti-Corruption Com-
mission Law No. 62 for the 
year 2006. Published in the 
Official Gazette, Issue No. 
4794, Page 4534 on 30 
November 2006.
3 Chief investigator of the 
Anti-Corruption Commis-
sion, personal communica-
tion, September 2012.
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not be accepted. Given that the number of applicants for such low-skill jobs usually 
exceeds the positions available, an MP’s wasta provides the final “push” that may 
give one applicant an advantage over all the other applicants who also satisfy the 
requirements and who are thus equally qualified for the job. In situations other than 
employment, an MP’s ability to provide wasta rests on his or her knowledge of cur-
rent policies in a certain ministry or department and the likelihood of a certain ap-
plication being approved at a certain moment. In other cases, the MP’s knowledge, 
or that of his or her acquaintances, of bureaucratic procedures allows him or her to 
use contradictions or loopholes in existing laws and procedures to the benefit of the 
supplicant. While some wasta cases are indeed criminal, the majority of them take 
place within formal laws and procedures – or even because of them.
The difficulty in curbing wasta lies in the confusion over its nature. The state 
and NGOs understand it as a form of corruption in the sense of abuse of office for 
private gain. Hence, they try to curb it by recourse to the usual tools of fighting cor-
ruption, which aim to enforce the rule of law through legal procedures and codes 
of conduct. Wasta, however, is usually not a problem of criminal justice, but one of 
distributive justice. That is why while wasta pervades different dimensions of social 
and economic life in Jordan, it constitutes a problem only when it provides differ-
ential access to common resources managed by the state or by some other corporate 
entity such as a private or public corporation. Bureaucratic justice requires that 
citizens are given equal access to these resources; thus, bureaucrats must, in prin-
ciple, treat different citizens with equal indifference. Being equal, citizens become 
substitutable options among which the bureaucrat may choose as s/he pleases as 
long as the choice fits the formal criteria of their similarity. Here, the role of wasta 
is to provide that extra-bureaucratic preference, which inevitably supplements legal 
and bureaucratic indifference. 
For citizens, the discrepancy between the state’s promise of formal and legal 
equality and the glaring fact of social inequality only breeds public suspicion towards 
the state apparatus. Yet, the strict application of law and procedures cannot elimin-
ate wasta because, in most cases, it is not illegal. At the same time, the implemen-
tation of codes of ethics and standards of transparency legitimises highly invasive 
practices that infringe on the private lives of officials and their social circles. The 
mere appointment of an official’s relative to the bureaucracy, or his or her winning 
of a public contract, can be sufficient cause for public suspicion of wasta. Within this 
space of public suspicion, wasta emerges as both the problem and the most viable 
solution. Citizens feel that wasta is the cause of the social injustice to which they are 
subjected, but it is also a way for them to achieve social justice. This is the dynamic 
that plays out in electoral politics and that democratisation fuels further.
Universal Welfare and Service Provision as a  
Possible Remedy
One concrete example can help illustrate how wasta as a problem of distributive 
justice can be tackled. Jordan provides free health coverage in public health facil-
ities for citizens below the age of six and above the age of sixty. Those between the 
ages of six and sixty need to either buy private health insurance or pay healthcare 
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costs out of their own pocket. Those who cannot afford healthcare and suffer from 
medical conditions that require long-term and costly treatment could petition the 
Ministry of Health or the Royal Court to receive a fixed-term healthcare subsidy 
in public health facilities. Prior to 2012, however, these subsidies were not easy to 
get, often taking a long time to obtain. Citizens often solicited MPs’ wasta to obtain 
these subsidies in a timely manner. When, in 2012, the Royal Court announced a 
clear set of criteria for obtaining these subsidies and provided them immediately to 
anyone who met the criteria, the MPs’ wasta was no longer necessary. This, how-
ever, caused the subsidy budget to soar in 2013 to approximately JOD 800 million 
(EUR 990 million), up from JOD 300 million (EUR 370 million) in the previous 
year. While this solution may not be sustainable in the long term, a robust system of 
universal health coverage in public facilities could be a viable alternative. 
Tackling wasta as a source of public suspicion of corruption requires shifting 
the focus from criminal justice to distributive justice. This would help overcome the 
limitations of conventional global anti-corruption policies in dealing with similar 
practices in the Middle East and beyond. The competition over limited resources 
that fuels wasta can be reduced through universal welfare and public service pro-
grammes. 
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